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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ERNEST BLODGETT
[DON WILLIAMS], Appellant.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-A search of a cab
cannot be justified on the ground that the cab driver could
have been arrested for double parking, since it has no relation
to the traffic violation and would not be incidental to an arrest
therefor.
[2] Arrest-Without Warrant.-There is nothing unreasonable in
an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night, or in ordering them out of a cab for questioning at night where their
unusual conduet warrants it.
[3] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-Where an officer,
who had reasonable grounds for ordering suspects from a cab
for questioning, saw defendant's furtive action in withdrawing
his left hand from behind the seat at the juncture of the seat
and back cushion, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe
that defendant was hiding contraband, and a search of the
cab was reasonable.
[4a.4b] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a proseeution for illegal possession
of marijuana, misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in attempting to suggest to the jury that defendant had taken
heroin the evening before his arrest did not constitute ground

[1) See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 52 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [2J
ArrC'!'t, ~5: [4] Criminal Law, §1404(6); [5] Witnl'sses, §100.
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for reversal where, in view of the evidence in the case, SUell
misconduct did not result in a miscarriage of justice. (Const.,
art. VI, § 4%.)
[5] Witnesses-Questions.-Questions asked of witnesses on either
direct or cross-examination, relating to the taking of heroin
by defendant on the evening preceding his arrest, are improper in a prosecution for possession of marijuana.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County and from an order denying a new trial. Charles
Wade Snook, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment
of conviction affirmed.
Benjamin F. Marlowe for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Victor Griffith, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was found guilty by a jury
of one count of possessing marijuana in violation of Health
and Safety Code, section 11500. His motions for probation
and for a new trial were denied, and be was sentenced to
serve three months in the county jail. He appeals from the
judgment and the order denying his motion for a new trial.
At approximately 8 p. m. on August 4, 1954, Nowlin
Sanders and Mrs. Jacqueline Grundy met defendant on the
street near the Willow Hotel at 7th and Willow in Oakland.
Sanders had known defendant for about three months. The
three went into the restroom of the hotel where they stayed
for five or ten minutes. Defendant gave Sanders $10 to
make some kind of purchase. Sanders left the hotel, made
the purchase, and returned, and the three spent another ten
minutes in the restroom. They then visited a friend in
another hotel, and after they left and were walking on the
street defendant told Mrs. Grundy and Sanders that he had
bought five "joints of pot" i.e., marijuana. Defendant and
Sanders shared a marijuana cigarette, and the parties separated. At approximately 3 a. m. the following morning
Mrs. Grundy and Sanders were together at the Willow Hotel.
Sanders left to get a cab, found one at a taxi stand a block
away, got in the front seat and asked the driver to drive
to the hotel. The cab double parked in front of the hotel

)

i

116

)

PEOPLE

v.

BLODGETT

[46 C.2d

and Sanders went in. Shortly thereafter Mrs. Grundy came
out of the hotel, got in the cab, and sat on the right side of
the rear seat. At about the same time defendant approached
the cab and told the driver that he wished to go to 12th and
Broadway. The driver told him that if his other fare was
going in the same direction, he could go along. Defendant
then entered the cab and sat on the left side of the rear seat.
In the meantime, Officers Barker and Tarabochia of the
Oakland Police Department had been observing the cab as
it stood in front of the hotel and decided to investigate it.
They approached and ordered the occupants to get out. As
Officer Barker opened the left rear door he saw defendant
withdraw his left hand from behind the seat at the juncture
of the seat and back cushion. After defendant and Mrs.
Grundy got out, the officer removed the rear seat and found
three marijuana cigarettes where defendant had withdrawn
his hand. The driver testified that earlier in the evening he
had to clean out the back of his cab because a passenger had
been ill. He had taken the seat out and at that time there
were no cigarettes in the back of the cab. No one had been
in the back seat thereafter until Mrs. Grundy and defendant
sat there. After the officers had ordered Mrs. Grundy and
defendant out of the cab, Sanders came out of the hotel.
The officers then asked the cab driver to take all of them to
the police station. Sanders asked defendant why they were
being arrested and defendant replied that the police had
found some "pot." Defendant told the interviewing officer
at the police station that at the time he was ordered out of
the cab he had his left hand in his pocket and took it out
to push back on the seat to raise himself. He stated that
he had not smoked marijuana for about a year. At the trial
he denied having smoked marijuana with Sanders and denied
placing the marijuana cigarettes in the cab. Mrs. Grundy,
Sanders, and the driver also denied placing the cigarettes in
the cab.
Defendant contends that the search of the cab was unlawful
and that the evidence obtained thereby was therefore inadmissible. The search was made without a warrant. [1] Although the cab driver could have been arrested for double
parking, the search of his cab cannot be justified on that
ground, for it had no relation to the traffic violation and
would not have been incidental to an arrest therefor. (Of.
People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776 [291 P.2d 469]; Elliott v.
State, 173 Tenn. 203 [116 S.W.2d 1009, 1012-1013]; Umted.
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States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 [52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877,
82 A.L.R. 775].) [2] It was justified, however, on another
ground. There is nothing unreasonable in an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night. (People v. Simon, 45
CaI.2d 645, 650-651 [290 P.2d 531]; Gisske v. Sanders, 9
Ca1.App. 13, 16-17 [98 P. 43]), and in view of the hour and
tbe unusual conduct of the occupants of the cab it was not
unreasonable for the officers to order them to get out of the
cab for questioning. [3] Since Officer Barker saw defendant's furtive action in getting out, he had reasonable grounds
to believe that he was biding contraband and the searcb of tbe
cab was therefore reasonable. (Carrol v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 149 [45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790] ;
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701 [51 S.Ct. 240,
75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407] ; Scher v. United States, 305
U.S. 251, 255 [59 S.Ot. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151]; Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 165-171 [69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed.
1879]; United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sed<Ln Automobile, 167 F.2d 3, 7.)
[4a] Defendant also contends that be did not have a fair
trial because of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in
attempting to suggest to the jury that defendant had taken
heroin the evening before his arrest.
During bis opening statement tbe prosecuting attorney
told the jury that defendant, Sanders and Mrs. Grundy bad
gone into the restroom of the Willow Hotel, and that while
there bad "talked about the purchasing of some heroin."
Upon defendant's objection the prosecuting attorney told
the court that he was merely stating what he expected to
prove and that he would not prove it if the court ruled the
matter out. He was instructed to proceed. He then stated
that defendant had given Sanders a $10 bill, that Sanders
departed and returned a few minutes later with something
in his hand, and that the three had "stayed in there for
fifteen or twenty minutes and then departed."
Mrs. Grundy testified as a witness for the People. On
direct examination, in answer to the question CCAnd what did
you do while you were in the restroom at the Willow Hotel,"
she said, "He [Sanders] put a paper which was believed to
be heroin--" Defendant objected and the matter was
taken up in chambers. The court ruled that testimony concerning the conduct of the parties in the restroom was admissible solely to show their relationship, but struck from
the record the reference to heroin as "immaterial and as a
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volunteer statement and not responsive." A later objection
was also sustained when, upon cross-examination, defendant
was asked, .. And you know the effects [of heroin] because
you yourself ha,'e been the recipient of a shoU" [5] It was
immaterial to the one-count charge of possession of marijuana whether or not defendant had taken heroin the evening preceding his arrest (see People v. Perez, 128 Cal.
App.2d 750, 756 [276 P.2d 72] ; ct. People v. Le Beau, 39 Cal.
2d 146, 148 [245 P.2d 302]), and the trial court therefore
properly sustained these objections.
[4b] No further direct reference was made to heroin,
but Mrs. Grundy and Sanders were questioned in detai1
concerning the activities of the three in the restroom. During
the questioning it was brought out that they had partaken
of Sanders' purchase. It is apparent from the repeated
references to the restroom and the conduct therein that the
purpose of the questions was to keep constantly before the
jury the suggestion in the opening statement that could not
properly be proved. (C/. People v. Mullings, 83 Cal. 138,
145-146 [23 P. 229, 17 Am.St.Rep. 223].) A careful review
of the entire record convinces us, however, that this misconduct did not result in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 4~.)
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and
McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-J dissent.
I cannot agree that the sight of a cab parked in front of
a hotel in the ear1y hours of the morning is sufficient to
constitute reasonable cause for a police investigation. The
law, as set forth in People v. Simon, 45 Ca1.2d 645, 648
[290 P.2d 531], is that" ..• the search of defendant's person may be justified only if he was committing or attempting
to commit an offense in the officer 'a presence (Pen. Code,
§ 836, subd. 1), or the officer had reasonable cause to believe
he had committed a felony. (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 5.)"
Just how it can be said that two people getting into a cab
early in the morning is "unusual conduct" is not entirely
clear to me. I had thought that it was a frequent occurrence.
"Under these circumstances, to permit an officer to justify
a search on the grollno that he' didn't feel' that a person
on the street at night had any lawful business there would

)

)

Feb. 1956]

PEOPLE V. BLODGETT
[46 C.2d 114; 293 P.2d 57]

119

expose anyone to having his person searched by any sus·
picious officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions were.
Innocent people, going to or from evening jobs or entertainment, or walking for exercise or enjoyment, would suffer
along with the occasional criminal wbo would be turned up."
(Mr. Justice Traynor, speaking for tbe court, in People v.
Simon, supra, at pp. 6:)0, 651.) If the sight of two people
getting into a taxicab ~ front of a hotel early in the morning constitutes reasonable cause to believe that a felony is
being committed, tben any couple out for an evening of entertainment may be subjected to police surveillance and search.
This, in the words of Mr. Justice Jackson (UnitJd States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 [68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210], is a
"greater danger to a free people tban the escape of some
criminals from punisbment."
It would appear that the salutary rule of People v. Cahan,
44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905], is to be circumscribed by an
unlimited and unwarranted extension of tbe concept of what
constitutes reasonable cause. In People v. Martin, ante,
p. 106 [293 P.2d 52], the sight of two men parked in
an automobile at nigM was held to constitute reasonable cause
for a poliee investigation and warrant a search of their
persons and automobile; here, the sight of a man and woman
getting in a cab in front of a hotel in the early hours of the
morning is held to constitute reasonable cause for police
investigation and a search of their persons and the taxicab.
It is no answer that the search showed illegal possession of
narcotics since the search may not be justified because it,
in fact, shows tbat the defendant was gU1lty of a felony.
(People v. Brown, 45 Ca1.2d 640 [290 P.2d 528]; People
v. Simon, 45 Ca1.2d 645 [290 P.2d 531].)
In the majority opinion it is stated that Officer Barker
had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was biding
contraband because of his "furtive action" in getting out
of the cab for questioning. In Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 160 [45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790], the
court very carefully and at length set forth the evidence
and noted that the officers had known of the bootlegging
activities of the defendants for two montlls prior to the
f,earch and seizure; in Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694
[51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.n. 1407], the officer had
received prior, reliable information that Husty was carrying
contraband; in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 [69
S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879], the officer conducting the search
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had arrested the defendant some five months prior to the
search for carrying liquor and had seen him on at least two
occasions in the six months preceding the search loading
liquor in his car which, on the day in question, appeared to
be heavily loaded with what the defendant admitted to be
liquor; in United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan .Automobile, 167 F.2d 3, the officer bad received advance reliable
information tbat the defendant would make delivery of tax
unpaid alcohol in a certain vicinity. It may therefore be
seen that all of the cases relied upon by the majority are
easily distinguishable from the one here under consideration
in that in all of them the facts showed some basis for suspecting that a crime was being committed.
I also disagree vehemently with the statement in the majority opinion that "there is nothing unreasonable in an
officer's questioning persons outdoors at night." Cited in
support of tbis statement are People v. Simon, 45 Ca1.2d
645 [290 P.2d 531], and Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.App. 13
[98 P. 43J, neither of whicb supports the statement as it is
here set forth.
Because the searcb was conducted without reasonable cause
to believe on the part of the officers that a felony was being
committed, the evidence procured thereby was illegally obtained and inadmissible under the rule set forth in People
v. Oa'JuJ,n, 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905].)
I would therefore reverse the judgment.
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